So, If Hume is Correct, What is He Saying?

Assuming Hume is correct, that making inferences about causal relations requires justification, such that, drawing any conclusions by means of induction means relying heavily on believing in the Uniformity Principle, which, he takes to be, in itself, unjustifiable; therefore, coming to such conclusions is without reasonable justification. In order for one to have justice in holding the Uniformity Principle to be true means that it would be reasonable to draw conclusions about Matters of Fact claims about the unobserved. The reason for why it is unjustifiable to draw conclusions about Matters of Fact claims about the unobserved is that, often (or always), people do not have veridical knowledge about the unobserved, in such a way that would allow them to claim, “I know the sun is going to rise in the East tomorrow,” or even rise at all, for that matter. Now, Hume is not in the business of discounting the said claim, but he is in the business of inquiring whether or not we have any better reason to believe the said claim than to not believe it. When it comes to drawing conclusions about Matters of Fact claims about the unobserved, Hume suspends judgment, and advocates this very notion: if the truth-value of a claim cannot be verified with evidential reasoning, thus is indeterminate, one shall suspend judgment. From this it seems as though Hume is most interested in drawing justified conclusions based on evidential reason, rather than merely relying on pragmatic conclusions (conclusions reasoned based on a subject’s “best interest”). He appears to be conveying to his audience (and hopefully more) that it is foolish or folly to draw conclusions about (or even believe in) general causal relations without the presence of evidential justification. Moreover, he is not saying, not to believe, but to be aware of the customs and habits that draw us into certain beliefs. Furthermore, he is not asking for proof for why we believe unobserved Matters of Fact claims, but suggesting that we acknowledge that customs and habits are distinct from our faculty of rationality.

To begin with, I’d like to address an objection to Hume’s argument and then move on to what I take to be Hume’s over-arching aim in finding fault in inductive reasoning, drawing conclusions about the unobserved Matter of Facts claims, and using the Uniformity Principle to justify one’s ultimate reasoning.

The objection that the Uniformity Principle is knowable a priori, thus deeming Hume’s whole pursuit as futile, seems easily refuted; the reason for this claim is on the assumption that the future may not resemble the past, for it is conceivable that even the laws of nature are subject to change. It is possible, to Me, that the laws of nature were different during the era of dinosaurs; some are likened to the claim that force has always been equal to mass times acceleration, but upon empirical observation (of bones and the like), the beasts that roam the Earth now are significantly smaller than the beasts that inhabited the prehistoric Earth. From this claim, it seems utterly plausible that the force back then may have been equal to mass2 times acceleration, allowing for beings to be much larger than historic and present beings on Earth. Let us be clear though, I am not saying anything about the whole ‘truth-ness’ of this hypothesis, since I can further conceive an objection to my own claim, one that appeals to the species of sharks, claimed to have lived throughout the prehistoric into the historic age; rather, I am forming and raising this counter-example so as to expose fault in holding that the Uniformity Principle is knowable a priori. Now, I grant that this poses fault to my original claim, that the laws of nature appear subject to change; yet, still I can conceive that the sharks during prehistoric times may have been significantly larger than present-day sharks and further appeal to findings of Megalodon-shark teeth, meaning that there existed extra-large aquatic animals, and when the laws of nature changed, the sharks adapted to be smaller in order to conform with the changing laws. So, since it is conceivable that the laws of nature are subject to change, it follows that the Uniformity Principle is not knowable a priori, further, that the future may not resemble the past; this is the reason for why the Uniformity Principle is indeed a Matter of Facts claim, rather than a Relation of Ideas claim. So, Hume’s reasoning holds: since the Uniformity Principle is not an adequate justification for believing in Matters of Fact claims about the unobserved from experience, we do not have adequate justification to draw conclusions about general causal relations.

Why do we care? We are going to continue to draw these sorts of conclusions anyway, even if we do not have adequate justification for doing so. Hume agrees; but his point is we need be aware that drawing such conclusions in this fashion is due to customs and habits, and are not due to rational reasoning. Hume appears to be suggesting that we acknowledge that customs and habits are distinct form our faculty of rationality, and that these customs and habits draw us into certain beliefs (about Matters of Fact claims of the unobserved). To me, this suggestion Hume is making offers up his ultimate conclusion about why it is necessary to acknowledge beliefs due to customs and habits are far different than having beliefs based on evidential reasoning. So, what I take Hume to be pointing out is that we have no better reason to believe in God than to not believe in God. It appears due to his argument against Induction, and my reinforcement (that the Uniformity Principle is not knowable a priori), it is due to customs and habits that people believe in God. Now, once again, Hume is not saying not to believe, but to be aware that beliefs based on customs and habits, as well as pragmatic reason, are less substantial than any form of hard, evidential reason. Furthermore, it appears both atheists and theists are mistaken (those whom hold a dogmatic view on rationalism), for there is neither evidential reason for nor against the existence of God, and since His existence is indeterminate, we should naturally suspend judgment on the matter. Even further, still accepting/assuming Hume is correct, then his target, “the destruction of what can be called ‘rational dogmatism’,” is reached, insofar as his proof that our non-evidential beliefs are based on mere custom; in other words, these beliefs are merely founded on our feelings and imagination, and not founded on evidential reason (Enquiry; xiii).